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ABSTRACT  
Pakistan with highest number of terrorism related deaths of any country over the past decade, 
the number exceeding the total terrorism related deaths for both the European and North 
American continents, provides an ideal laboratory to study impact of terrorism on the 
macroeconomy (GTD, 2012). Quasi-Structural VAR, VECM, Impulse Response Functions 
and Granger-Causality tests on a sample that covers over 4500 terrorist incidents and 
consequent 10, 200 deaths [from 1973 to 2010] are employed to study the relationship 
between terrorism and the macroeconomy. One of the major advantages of the current 
methodology is that it not only enables one to circumvent the heterogeneity biases inherent in 
cross-country studies but it also allows distinguishing between short and long-run effects. It is 
documented that cumulatively terrorism has cost Pakistan around 33.02 % of its real national 
income i.e. terrorism costs Pakistan around 1 % of real GDP per capita growth every year. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies on the impact of terrorism on the economy have exclusively focused on developed 
countries (see e.g. Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Enders and Sander, 1996). This is surprising 
because developing countries are not only hardest hit by terrorism, but are more responsive to 
external shocks. Terrorism in Pakistan, with magnitude greater than Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Spain and US combined
1
  in terms of incident and death count, has consistently hit news 
headlines across the world. Yet, terrorism in Pakistan has received relatively little academic 
attention
2
.  Only recently (post 9/11), due to the strategic importance of 'war on terror' for the 
economic powers of the world and much higher death rates, terrorism in Pakistan has 
attracted more local and global attention. The nations in the NATO alliance (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) have secured their borders against terrorism through a proactive 
counterterrorism strategy, which has resulted in increased terrorist activities in logistically 
easier targets such as Pakistan. Various game theoretic analyses and empirical studies make 
the point that terrorists move to softer or easier targets when the probability of success of 
traditional targets decreases. For example, the installation of metal detectors at airports 
deflected terrorism targets from skyjacking, towards logistically easier activities of hostage 
taking and assassinations (Enders and Sandler, 1993).  
 The persistence of the problem of terrorism did not stimulate the government or academics 
of the country to undertake a thorough examination of the costs of terrorism.   No systematic 
study focuses on estimating the loss to aggregate economic variables.  Some data are 
presented on cost of terrorism in Pakistan (For example, see IMF PRSPP, 2010, p.3 and 
Pakistan Economic Survey, 2011), but they are crude estimates without much scientific basis 
(for example, both are subjective estimates by government officials). This dearth of 
comprehensive analysis of terrorism in Pakistan limits policy makers and academics’ ability 
to formulate and test hypotheses, to conduct operational planning and to take effective 
counterterrorism measures for Pakistan, a point also noted by Hussain (2010).  Furthermore, 
the conclusions from most of the studies on economic impact of terrorism cannot be readily 
applied to Pakistan as they are cross-country analyses where various country-specific factors 
are naturally ignored. These studies are especially prone to heterogeneity bias. In their 
seminal article, Blomberg, Hees and Orphanides (2004) note that controlling for various 
country specific effects by including dummy variables in their cross-country growth 
regressions to study the impact of terrorism on an economy are “crude” estimations at best. 
Enders and Sandler (2006) also note that different “institutional structures and levels of 
terrorism” make cross-country analysis of terrorism suspect (Enders and Sandler, 2006 
p.214).  It is posited here that the study of terrorism and its impact on economy should be 
made on a case-by-case basis. This paper estimates the economic costs of terrorism for 
Pakistan with particular focus on post 9/11 costs. 
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 The mentioned countries are thought to be biggest victims of terrorism and have received the most academic 
attention. 
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  The notable analysis of Hussain (2010) on the spatial patterns of terrorist attacks stands out. 
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  The case of Pakistan is unique for studying the impact of terrorism on the economy for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, Pakistan has a long and intense history of terrorism
3
 which allows 
one to capture the effect on the economy in the long run. Secondly, growth retarding effects 
of terrorism are hypothesized to be more pronounced in developing rather than developed 
countries (Blomberg et al, 2004; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer, 2007). Thirdly, the Pakistani 
economy is exceptionally vulnerable to external shocks with 12 IMF programmes during 
1990-2007 (IMF, 2010; 2011). Lastly, the case study of terrorism for a developing or least 
developing country is yet to be done. Scholars of the Copenhagen Consensus 2008 studying 
terrorism note the “need for additional case studies, especially of developing countries” 
(Enders and Sandler, 2008 p.31).  This research attempts to fill this void.  
Post 9/11, in a short span of around 10 years, many studies on terrorism and its economic 
consequences have been conducted and terrorism has been theorized to adversely affect the 
economy through various channels.  For example, it is hypothesized to have an adverse effect 
on GDP through loss in savings through reduction in FDI and tourism revenues (Enders and 
Sandler, 1996; Enders, Parise and Sandler, 1992), reallocation of resources from consumer 
and investment spending to relatively unproductive military spending (Blomberg et al., 2004; 
Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004). It can have negative repercussions on the financial sector by 
increasing transaction costs (Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006) and 
can cause a reduction in bilateral trade through tightening of border controls (Nitsch and 
Schumarcher, 2004).  In the current study, these channels are carefully explored by the means 
of a Quasi-Structural VAR (Enders, 2010). Ocal and Yildrim (2010) distinguish the impact of 
terrorism on the economy into three separate time periods. The first is the short-run direct 
effect of destruction of factors of production. Second is the medium-run effect of loss in 
consumer and investor confidence. And third is the long-run loss in productivity due to 
increase in transaction costs due to higher risk premiums and counterterrorism related 
expenditures. Given the long history of terrorism and concentration of terrorism in economic 
hubs
4
 for Pakistan, there it can be expected that the adverse effects of terrorism on growth 
would not just be profound but would be felt through both the short and long run channels. In 
the presence of a cointegrating relationship, the short-run effects can be evaluated by Vector 
Error Correction extension of the Quasi-Structural VAR, where significant lagged 
differenced estimates capture the short run effects, while the statistical significance of error 
correction term signify the long-run effects (see e.g. Verbeek, 2008). 
The results of the estimations suggest that terrorism has cost Pakistan around 33 .02  percent 
of its real national income over the sample time period of 1973 to 2008, with the adverse 
impact mainly stemming from fall in domestic investments and lost workers’ remittances 
from abroad. This averages to a per annum loss of around 1 % of real GDP per capita growth. 
Moreover, VECM estimates show that terrorism impacts the economy primarily through 
medium and long run channels. The article also finds that the negative effect of terrorism 
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 The first recorded events date back to the birth of the nation when the first Prime Minister of Pakistan was shot 
dead in October 1951. Moreover, during the sample period under study more than 4500 terrorist incidents were 
recorded (CIA declassified documents, 2000; GTD, 2012). 
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  According to Global Terrorism Database (2011) from 1973-2008 around 65% of terrorist violence was in the 
four provincial capitals. 
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lasts for at least 2 years for most of the macroeconomic variables studied, with the adverse 
effect on worker remittances, a hitherto ignored factor, lasting for 5 years. The results are 
robust to different lag length structures, policy variables, structural breaks and stability tests. 
Furthermore, it is shown that they are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, or [Granger 
type] reverse causality. Hence, the article finds evidence that terrorism, particularly in 
emerging economies, might pose significant macroeconomic costs to the economy. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2, provides a historical background of 
terrorism in Pakistan. This is followed by a section on theoretical framework outlining the 
most important theoretical contributions on terrorism and the macroeconomy. Section 4 
describes the data, while section 5 discusses the empirical methodology and provides the 
VAR estimations. This follows a section on the sensitivity of results where various 
econometric and economic robustness checks are performed. Next two sections are devoted 
to an analysis of counter-factual scenarios and persistence of terrorism.  The penultimate 
section discusses the main results in light of theory and recent evidence. A final section 
provides some concluding remarks. 
 
HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND  AND  OVERVIEW  
Terrorism
5
 in Pakistan, influenced by various global and local events, went through various 
evolutionary stages.  In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haque came to power through a military coup 
and arrested and later executed the then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This led to a 
formation of a terrorist out-fit named Al-Zulfiqar. In order to quash the terrorist outfit and Mr 
Bhutto’s popularity in his home province, General Zia created an ethnic based militant 
political party in his province, composed of immigrants from India, the Muhajir Qaumi 
Movement (MQM). Terrorism by and against MQM has accounted for around 40 per cent of 
all terrorist violence in the country since its formation (Fair, 2004). General Zia, to establish 
his own constituency and legitimize his rule, also enforced some strict Islamic laws in the 
country based on a certain Sunni jurisprudence. The Iranian revolution encouraged the 
minority religious sect (Shias) in Pakistan, to openly protest against the Sunni interpretation 
of laws and demanded that they should be exempt from the law. General Zia, responded 
again, by creating an anti-Shia religious militant organization (Sipah-e-Sahaba). The SSP 
gave rise to many splinter terrorist groups. Around 30% of all terrorism in Pakistan can be 
traced back to SSP, including the current wave of suicide terror attacks post 9/11 (Hussain, 
2010). Another factor greatly influencing the evolution of terrorism in Pakistan is the Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. To counter the Soviet threat, the US injected around six 
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 To qualify for an act to be considered terrorism the following GTD criteria had to be fulfilled: 
1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;  
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message 
to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and  
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.  
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billion dollars into the region to fight the Soviets (Weiner, 1998).  After the soviet withdrawal 
in 1989, the US left the region with thousands of battle hardened and armed militants who, 
ironically, turned against Pakistan and the US after 9/11. 
The terrorism in Pakistan went through two major stages (see figure 1). The first stage 
occurred with coinciding of ethnic and sectarian terrorism as a consequence of formation of 
MQM and separatist movements in Baluchistan (one of Pakistan’s four provinces). The 
second stage was one of religious terrorism, which was a consequence of incurring the wrath 
of militants because of Pakistan’s support for US in its war against terror. As can be seen in 
figure 5, recent wave of terror has been much more deadly in terms of fatalities
6
. For 
example, from 1973-2001, average terrorism induced deaths per year were around 125, 
whereas from 2001-2008, the death toll had risen more than three-fold with over 480 
fatalities per year. 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of Terrorist incidents and terrorism induced deaths in Pakistan from 1973-20107. 
 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) note that the losses through the open economy channels due 
to terrorism might be limited if investors have opportunities to diversify their portfolio 
domestically. Such an opportunity is apparently not available to investors in Pakistan, 
especially when we observe the spatial distribution of the terrorist events. Hussain (2010) 
studies the geographical distribution of terrorist attacks from 1974-2007 and observes that 
though over time the motivation of terrorism varied, its geography remained exceedingly 
similar.  The Geographical Information System (GIS) map is reproduced in Figure 2 with 
incident count in the capitals given in parenthesis. Around 65 percent of terrorism in Pakistan 
occurred in the four provincial capitals and federal capital (Karachi: 1152, Lahore: 909, 
Quetta 82, Peshawar: 133 and Islamabad: 69), which is also where most of production of the 
country takes place. The GIS  map gives us an overview on spatial distribution of terrorism in 
                                                             
6
 Increased death rate post 2004 was a direct result of a rise in suicide bombing. 
7
 Source:  Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
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Pakistan and makes the point that most of the terrorism occurred at the production centres of 
Pakistan and contrary to the popular perception in Pakistan,  most of the terrorism does not 
occur in the remote tribal areas in North-East. Hence, this combined with Pakistan’s relative 
openness
8
 emphasises that the adverse effects of terrorism, especially through the open 
economy channels cannot be ignored when studying terrorism in Pakistan.   
Figure 2. Terrorist Incident distribution of Pakistan for period of 1974-2007 [Hussain: 2010]. 
The negative association of terrorism and GDP per capita can be observed from the evolution 
of GDP per capita growth and terrorist risk in Pakistan over the past decades. Instead of 
relying on the much used measure of incident count, a terrorism risk index along the lines of 
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) is constructed that explicitly considers the magnitude of terrorist 
attacks by incorporating deaths and injuries in the measure
9
 (See A.1 for more details). Use 
of traditional measures of terrorist activity i.e. incident and death counts do not significantly 
change the results. Nevertheless, the death count and terrorism index measures gives one 
more efficient estimates than incident count. During our sample period the terrorism index 
increases by more than 700%. Moreover, on average, an increase in terrorist index by 500% 
corresponds to an increase of terrorist activities by 43 events and consequent 68 deaths and 
135 fatal injuries. 
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 For example, trade openness ratio for Pakistan averaged around 26 per cent during our period of study. 
9
 This becomes important as deaths per incident greatly varied according to the particular wave of terrorism (see 
Figure 1).  
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  As can be seen in Figure 3, a period of increased terrorist risk often coincided with a period 
of lower income growth in Pakistan. Moreover, negative correlation coefficient between 
terror index and GDP per capita growth is observed. However, one should note that a 
dramatic increase in GDP post 9/11 is seen even with high terrorism levels. This is as a direct 
result of economic reforms in 2000s with a flurry of privatizations and liberalizations in 2001 
by the Musharraf regime (Qayyum et al. 2008)
10
. It is of course not implied that terrorism or 
security situation is the only determinant of income growth. However, it is posited here that 
at least a part of the growth retardation is attributed to increase in terrorism. More careful 
econometric scrutiny will uncover that terrorism indeed exerts a large statistically and 
economically significant negative impact on the macroeconomy.  
 
 
Figure 3. Terrorism Index and real GDP per capita growth in constant 2000 dollars11 [Source WDI, GTD and own 
computations]. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Economists have long been interested in understanding the economic consequences of 
conflict and war (Keynes, 1919; Robbins, 1942). Economic reasoning can be readily applied 
from conflict to terrorism.  However, terrorism differs from conflict in the sense that several 
criteria need to be simultaneously fulfilled for an act to be classified as terrorism. For 
example, not only should the extra normal violence be perpetrated by sub-national groups and 
directed at an audience beyond the immediate effectee, but a political, religious or ideological 
motive is required (Enders and Sandler, 2006).  
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 For a detailed review on the economy of Pakistan, see Easterly (2003). 
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 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (WB) and Global Terrorism Data Base (GTD). Data for 
GDP series was available till 2011,  however terrorist data was only available till 2010. 
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  The purpose of the following two subsections is to describe the most important theoretical 
contributions to study the impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy. After elucidation of the 
two main models, its testable implications will be presented which will become the basis for 
choice of variables and specifications.   
In the past, two formal models by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) and Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2008) were proposed, to study impact of terrorism on the economy, each focusing on 
particular factors and channels through which terrorism affects the economy. The Eckstein 
and Tsiddon (2004) closed economy model hypothesizes an increase in total discount rate to 
translate into a reduction of income and other macroeconomic variables, while Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2008), hereafter referred to as AG (2008), open economy model hypothesizes 
capital out flow to have an adverse effect on the economy. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) 
model is a closed economy framework whereas AG (2008) model assumes perfect capital 
mobility. Pakistan, like most countries with exports and gross capital formation averaging 
around 13.9 and 16.7 per cent of GDP respectively, during our period of study makes the 
analyses of both closed and open economy channels important. Explanations of the models 
follow. 
Eckstein and Tsiddon Model  
 Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), hereafter referred to as ET (2004), is one of the few studies 
that formally model the effect of terrorism on the economy
12
. ET (2004) builds on the 
Blanchard-Yaari Model (Yaari, 1965; Blanchard, 1985) by introducing an exogenous 
increase in death rate caused by terrorism. They assert changes in (perceived) life expectancy 
caused by terrorism adversely affect the economy through a reaction
13
 by government and 
individuals. Governments respond to terrorism by consuming more defence goods, whereas 
individuals change their consumption and investment patterns. The theory predicts that the 
increase in probability of death caused by terrorism (which individuals translate into increase 
of value of present relative to future) reduces steady states level of investment in the short run 
and consumption and production in the long run. ET (2004) extends the Blanchard-Yaari 
Model by introducing terrorism and defence spending in the model. They do this by making 
the death rate endogenous. Now, terrorism increases the death rate which is no longer 
constant as in the Blanchard-Yaari model, and government can intervene to decrease the 
death rate by increasing counterterrorism expenditures:  
 (1)                                                   
 G and F represent government spending and total production, respectively.  The model 
assumes that all government spending is done on production of defence which serves to 
produce security and decrease the (perceived) death rate. As can be seen from the structure of 
the model in (1), the defence production is positive, constant and financed by non-
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 Many scholars including Walter Enders and BHO (2004) recognize the absence other formal models on 
terrorism and the macroeconomy. 
13
 Krueger (2007) empirically explores the same phenomenon documenting an “over-reaction” by the affected 
governments  in the face of terrorism. 
9 
 
distortionary lump sum tax of G and that the perceived death rate is a decreasing function of 
government spending.  
 Furthermore, the government spends only a proportion of production on defence. As 
productive capital is spent on defence this decreases the capital stock in present but opens up 
the possibility of lesser discount rate due to increased security and hence relatively higher 
investment in the future.  An increase in terrorism will increase the perceived death rate 
resulting in reduced consumer confidence and higher consumption today relative to tomorrow 
which can now be mitigated through government buying security. Hence a rational 
government forgoes investment in capital stock to produce defence goods and hence buys 
security, as the alternative scenario would be steady state at even lower consumption and 
capital stock. 
 In the absence of government spending and terrorism, the equilibrium is at a point much 
lower than before as increased discount rate reduces consumption and investment in the long 
run. The extension by ET (2004) characterises the steady state output at an intermediate level 
in presence of government spending and terrorism, i.e. lesser than the equilibrium of no 
terrorism but higher output than that of terrorism and no government spending. 
ET (2004) derive this scenario of government rationally manufacturing security and obtain 
equation (2) and (3)
14
: 
(2)    )]+[d(G / G) - (F(K(G)) = Ui   
(3) (G)/d(G)d' =G  - F(K(G)) / 1 - F(K(G))'  
Since d'(G) < 0 (equation 5), optimal intervention of government implies F(K(G))' < 1 where 
F(K(G)) and F(K(G))' is net production and net marginal product respectively. The positive 
marginal product justifies government intervention and equilibrium at intermediate 
production level. The prediction of the framework is one of lower steady state capital, output 
and consumption in the long run but higher consumption and government spending in the 
short run. 
Abadie and Gardeazabal Model  
Before going to the empirical results, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) model of terrorism in 
an open economy setting is also worth mentioning.  AG (2008) theorize that capital mobility 
determines the equilibrium level of output in the face of terrorism, as direct or immediate 
costs of terrorism in terms destruction of capital are relatively insubstantial. However, their 
use of cross-sectional data limits the evaluation of this assumption, which is tested by 
estimating a VECM here. They note that international investors have various options to 
diversify their portfolio; hence terrorism induces agents to move their investments to safer 
locations. They extend a stochastic version of the AK endogenous growth model, by 
introducing shocks of terrorism to the domestic economy.   Terrorism reduces the mean and 
increases the variance (hence risk) of return on capital through two channels.  First, being the 
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 See ET (2004) for all the steps involved. 
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direct destruction of capital and second being decrease in marginal productivity of capital 
through increase in terrorism intensity or terrorism risk. As the model assumes perfect capital 
mobility, investors will look to diversify their portfolios by moving their investments to safer 
venues. The equilibrium will be one of lower investment from abroad and hence lower output 
growth in the presence of terrorism. Hence in the VAR equations, open economy channels 
are incorporated i.e. whether foreign direct investments and workers remittances from abroad 
are impacted by terrorism. The lack of  data on return and volatility of assets does not allow 
us to evaluate the sources of loss in these foreign investments. However, VECM extension 
allows one evaluate the (hypothesized negligible) short-run or immediate impact of terrorism. 
The above models have at least five testable implications which can be tested with the current 
data: 
(i)  Increased terrorism will reduce domestic investment through higher death rate adjusted 
discount rates and hence lower steady state output growth. 
(ii) Increased terrorism will induce governments to divert resources to relatively unproductive 
military spending. 
(iii) Increased terrorism will result in larger interest rates across the economy due to increased 
uncertainty and hence increase consumption in the short run but decrease it in the long run. 
(iv) Increased terrorism impacts open economy channels by decreasing returns on foreign 
investments. 
(v) Direct or short-run impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy is insubstantial as the loss 
to real economy is propagated through low productivity and lower returns. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND RELATED ISSUES
15
 
 The previous section provides a theoretical base for the specifications to follow. The models 
provided the testable predictions regarding the various channels through which terrorism 
might affect the income of a country. AG (2008) emphasised a large ‘indirect effect’ through 
the external sector which are evaluated by studying the impact of terrorism on  FDI, Exports, 
Worker Remittances from Abroad, in explaining the loss of income. ET (2004) on the other 
hand, in their closed economy framework, proposes a contraction of domestic investments, 
consumption and increased government spending to spearhead the decline in income. The 
results give tentative support for both models, with terrorism negatively affecting the income 
through a fall in domestic investments, exports, worker remittances
16
. Moreover, VECM 
estimates also support the AG (2008) hypothesis with negligible immediate or direct effects 
of terrorism. 
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 Further explanations, sources and related notes on all variables and labels can be found in Appendix A.1. 
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 See explanations in light of theoretical implications in the discussion of results. 
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  This section describes some data issues and elaborates on some important variables used in 
the study. As noted earlier, scholars from Copenhagen Consensus called for case-studies of 
terrorism for developing countries in 2008, yet not many studies could fill in this void. This 
was  probably due to the limited data available in developing countries, as was witnessed 
during the course of this study. Quarterly figures for GDP, investment, Exports were not 
available, whatever data that was available was highly fragmented. The data mainly came 
from Central Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Federal Bureau of Statistics Pakistan (FBS), Finance 
Ministry of Pakistan, Education Ministry and World Bank. Furthermore, data prior to 1973 
was almost never available.  
 RGDP is the log of annual real gross domestic Product per capita obtained from Central 
Bank of Pakistan's Handbook of Statistics (various issues). The data for terrorism is obtained 
from Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. GTD data is 
particularly reliable when compared to other databases
17
 as it is not only complied under the 
supervision of academics privy to technicalities of research but is also comprehensive for 
study of terrorism in Pakistan as the database contains vast amount of information in the form 
of 120 variables and considers events of all terrorist incidents as opposed to only international 
or transnational terrorist events.  Terrorism is defined as the “threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or 
social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (GTD website, 2012). Nevertheless, one 
should note two important limitations of GTD as it compiles data from various news agencies 
which makes it susceptible to media bias of reporting only spectacular events and the fact that 
GTD incident count grew rapidly from 1970s to 1980s which might also be due to increase in 
coding staff.  One should also note that terrorism here is taken in a broader sense that 
includes domestic as well as transnational terrorism. This is in contrast with most studies 
which focus on transnational or international terrorism. Only recently, the importance of 
domestic terrorism is recognized.  Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) note (by comparing 
and cross-checking against various datasets of terrorism) that domestic terrorist incidents 
vastly outnumber transnational terrorist events. Hence, for any proper estimation on 
macroeconomic costs of terrorism for Pakistan, both domestic as well as transnational 
terrorist events should be taken into account.  An intuitive index for terrorism in Pakistan 
similar to Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) construction of the index for Israel is calculated
18
. 
The index equals to the logarithm (e + the average of number of terrorist incidents, terrorism 
induced deaths and injuries)
19
.  The need for a terrorism index for Pakistan is recognized by 
Hussain (2010) dissertation on spatial patterns of terrorism in Pakistan. Furthermore, the 
index is more appropriate than the much used incident count measure as it directly accounts 
for the magnitude of terrorism. More importantly for the present study, incident count would 
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 South Asian Terrorism Portal is maintained by former police officer and is only available from 1988 onwards 
while ITERATE dataset mainly documents international terrorist incidents. See Figure G for plot of SATP and 
GTD incident counts. 
18
 The results from the index are similar to Israeli study; hence data from Pakistan with terrorism of much higher 
magnitude lends additional statistical validity to the index and encourages its use elsewhere. 
19
 The inclusion of exponential eliminates the problem when the average is zero and introduces a base of 1 when 
there is no terrorism.  
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fail to sufficiently capture to the atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and insecurity that is 
fundamental cause for agents to change their economic behaviour. The study combines 
insights from the closed economy, ET (2004) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) which 
enables one to capture substantial costs of terrorism that includes domestic as well as external 
costs.  
 Based on the ET (2004) model a measure of interest rate in the economy is needed that is 
responsive to short-term market fluctuations to see if terrorism through increased uncertainly 
increased the interest rates across the whole economy. The call money rate (which represents 
interbank lending rate) is used as it is more responsive to market fluctuations in Pakistan 
given the fixed interest rate policy of Pakistan till the 1990s. Table 1 below, gives summary 
statistics of major variables used in the specifications to follow: 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
         
 
Mean 
Standard 
Error Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance Minimum Maximum Obs 
Year 1991.5 1.755942 1991.5 11.11306 111 1973 2010 38 
RGDP 3.06827 0.105371 3.023145 0.632228 0.399712 1.63431 4.04605 38 
Rinv 2.273742 0.113081 2.28331 0.678489 0.460347 0.701743 3.48207 36 
RExp 2.172307 0.111838 2.221205 0.671026 0.450276 0.816555 3.27354 36 
RCon 0.722185 0.003559 0.717014 0.021355 0.000456 0.684242 0.761833 36 
Rintrate 11.09903 0.772227 10.63475 4.403768 21.46802 3.12006 22.8851 38 
FDI 0 .237302 0.013062 0.245008 0.078372 0.006142 0 0.37338 38 
TerrorIndex 4.245391 0.319039 4.914495 1.914233 3.66429 1 7.31081 38 
Inflation 9.623951 0.930822 8.094065 5.521262 31.19145 2.91413 26.663 38 
Wrem 1.184973 0.05431 1.229775 0 .33464 0.106186 0.311118 1.5885 38 
GovExp 0.947676 0.027807 0.970597 0.166843 0.027837 0.576912 1.18989 36 
InflationRisk 0.105263 0.050453 0 0.311012 0.096728 0 1 38 
ExRateRisk 0.1935484 0.0721312 0 0.4016097 0.1612903 0 1 31 
 Explanation of mnemonic labels and sources can be found below in Appendix A.1. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 A variant of VAR (which is an extension of AR models in a multivariate scenario) that 
describes dynamic evolution of variables from their common history is employed to study the 
impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy.  The use of VAR models allows us to move away 
from the tightly structured theoretical models and capture the dynamic relationship between 
variables. Sims (1980) has advocated the use of VAR models to explain the movements in 
various macroeconomic variables. A simple VAR has the advantage of not making the 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables as it considers all variables to be 
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endogenous. Furthermore, one does not need to impose arbitrary restrictions to ensure 
identification.  From a statistical point of view, the use of VAR is particularly useful in 
prediction as factors affecting various macroeconomic variables are many and varied. The 
dynamic relationships, interdependencies and evolution of GDP, investment, exports  are 
better captured by a VAR, relative to adherence to strict structural models with the  added 
advantage of being "more parsimonious and includes fewer lags (than AR models), and that 
more accurate forecasting is possible" (Verbeek, 2008, p.336).  There is also precedence in 
(Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Enders and Sandler, 1993) of using VARs to estimate impact of 
terrorism on macroeconomic variables.  The VAR is represented as follows: 
             
 Where,      is a lag polynomial equivalent to A1L1 +  A2L2 + A3L3 + … + ApLp, while    ,    
and C are n x 1 vectors, with     representing a vector of endogenous variables,    the vector of 
disturbance terms and C the vector of intercept terms, respectively.  
 Particularly, a mix of structural and standard VAR i.e. Quasi-Structural VAR is proposed to 
study the relationship of terrorism and the marcoeconomy in this relatively small sample. A 
Quasi-Structural VAR starts with an unrestricted model, then it imposes restrictions based on 
theory, Granger Causality tests and statistical significance (Enders, 2010). This method is 
robust in the sense that it gains from advantages of both standard and structural VARs while 
mitigating the disadvantages of both methods. Unlike simultaneous equation models, this 
methodology does not impose fixed coefficient expectational rules. It captures dynamics and 
coevolution of variables (Standard VAR), does not lose sight of theory (Structural VAR), 
while at the same time can be readjusted based on new evidence (new advantage). Zaman 
(2012) notes that the causal structures imposed ex ante in a structural VAR leaves no room to 
modify the specifications in response to evidence provided by data. The current methodology 
circumvents this problem and provides an opportunity to change the specification as new 
evidence come to light i.e. although, it bases the choice of variables on structural models, 
however, it drops the statistically insignificant independent variables and Granger uncaused 
dependent variables. This has additional advantage in small samples as lesser equations are 
specified and crucial degrees of freedom are saved. It is also more robust than single equation 
methods that utilizes quasi-randomization and instrumentation which according to Sims 
(2010) are often based on a “misunderstanding of exogeneity” (i.e., there is underlying 
endogeneity through omitted structural relationships). Furthermore, the single equation 
methods are criticised for their various heterogeneity biases and failure to take into account 
simultaneous coevolution of different variables (see Deaton, 2010). Quasi-Structural VAR 
tries to mitigate these concerns by taking a bird’s eye view, avoiding strict assumptions on 
exogeneity, modifying the specifications in response to evidence and studying the 
simultaneous coevolution of the variables. Additionally, Pesaran and Timmermann (2005) 
show that this method displays limited finite sample bias and small forecast errors. Hence, the 
current methodology is not only well suited to evaluate the impact of terrorism on the 
marcoeconomy but can also answer the much debated question of cost of post 9/11 terrorism, 
for example by comparing the predicted and actual growth path of the macroeconomy. 
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Based on the exclusion restrictions of statistical insignificance and Granger causality, the 
following system of Quasi-Structural VAR is specified, in natural logarithms
20
: 
 
(4)                                                               
               
 
(5)                                                                
                     
 
(6)                                                                   
                     
 
(7)                                                                    
 
(8)                                                                     
    
 
(9)  
                                                                  
    
 
(10)  
                                                                      
                     
 
 
The choice of variables and main results 
The Quasi-Structural VAR is specified based on three criteria. The first being one of 
parsimony in light of relatively small sample. Second, are the variables under scrutiny in the 
face of terrorism with theory and Granger-Causality tests deciding on what to treat as 
endogenous and third of course are the economic considerations based on ET (2004) and AG 
(2008) models
21
. The specifications are also different from other studies in that they take into 
account theoretical considerations, specifically those from ET (2004) and AG (2008). 
Furthermore, most studies almost omit the theoretical elements almost entirely and estimate 
bi-variate VAR or ARDL systems (see for example, Jaeger and Paserman, 2008; Shahbaz and 
Feridun 2010; Enders and Sandler, 1996). 
 Integration of order 1 for some variables in the series and subsequent co-integration as 
determined by Johansens test (1991) motivates the estimation of the equations in their natural 
logarithms of the level variables without a deterministic trend. First differences are not 
employed due to the cointegrating relationship and so various co-movements among 
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 See explanation of mnemonic labels of variables in Appendix A.1. 
21
 For example, the statistically insignificant consumption, real interest rate and FDI are always kept unless it 
dramatically increases standard errors in the estimated equations. 
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variables are not lost in the process [Doan (2000)].  
 Granger causality tests are also particularly useful here as it further reduces the number of 
estimated equations and hence saves the degrees of freedom, without compromising on 
complexity. Groenewold and Tang (2007) also recommend Granger-Causality tests, as they 
are applicable regardless of different orders of integration of variables. The tests reveal that 
though terrorism predicts changes in the macroeconomic variables in scrutiny, but the same 
cannot be said the other way round (see Table A in A.2). 
 The main results are presented in Table 2 where it can be seen that terrorism is negatively 
impacting GDP, domestic investment, exports, worker remittances and government spending 
after a one year lag with largest impact stemming from a fall in domestic investments and 
worker remittances from abroad. For a discussion of terrorism and its negative impact on 
government expenditures in light of implication (ii) see discussion of main findings section below. 
 A 10 % increase is terrorist risk index is associated around 1  %  fall in real GDP per capita 
with the similar increase in terrorist risk limiting domestic investments and worker 
remittances by 0.05 % each.  It is easy to derive the total cost of terrorism in terms of lost 
GDP for the entire sample period. This is done by considering the cumulative percentage 
increase in terrorism, actual GDP per capita from 1973 to 2008 (631 and 119 percentage 
point increase, respectively) and point estimate of terrorism (0.093). Following output gap 
literature (see Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007; D'Auria, 2010):  
Actual GDP with terrorism  = Potential GDP without terrorism (X) + Effect of Terror 
119 = X + (-0.093 x 631) 
Potential GDP without terrorism (X) = Actual GDP with terrorism + Effect of Terror 
X = (119) + (0.093 x 631) 
X  = 177.68 % 
Comparing the potential and actual real GDP per capita growth, the output gap due to 
terrorism is  
 
          
      
        
Similarly, based on the statistical variation in the point estimate, the range of potential 
increase in real GDP per capita is computed to be between 25.83 % to 39.95 %.  
 
Comments on the selected variables are also in order; RInv is a flow variable which measures 
value of new stock added which is more responsive to various shocks than gross investments.  
Moreover, worker remittances is also included that is a valuable source of foreign income for 
Pakistan which is motivated to stress on losses due to open economy channel of terrorism as 
laid out by AG (2008); it should be noted Pakistani citizens living abroad not only send 
money to family and friends for consumption, but is also is an important source of savings 
and investments from abroad. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) provides evidence for this 
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phenomenon from a broad panel of about 100 developing countries. The positive effect of 
remittances by easing liquidity constraints for investments is documented for countries with  
 
 
 
Table 2:  VAR Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES RGDP RInv FDI RExp RCon Wrem GovExp 
        
L.RGDP -0.86       
 (0.628)       
L.TerrIndex -0.09*** -0.05** 0.003 -0.01* -0.000 -0.05*** -0.01* 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.0027) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.006) 
L.RInv  0.86*** 0.10*** -0.05 0.00   
  (0.130) (0.016) (0.035) (0.002)   
L. FDI 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.014 0.02**  0.11** 0.04* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.001)  (0.040) (0.019) 
L.Rintrate 0.19** 0.18** -0.04***  -0.00 0.36 0.05** 
 (0.089) (0.076) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.036) (0.020) 
L.RExp 0.15**   0.01***    
 (0.059)   (0.033)    
L. RCon     0.09***   
     (0.008)   
L.inflation  0.03*** (0.096)    0.01** 
  (0.009) 0.03***    (0.002) 
L. Wrem      0.08***  
      (0.006)  
L. GovExp       0.09*** 
       (0.013) 
Constant  -0.45* -0.19 0.03** 0.05 0.15** -0.01 
  (0.223) (0.280) (0.011) (0.052) (0.068) (0.911) 
        
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Adj R-2 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.96 
F-statistic 109.01 160.39 116.70 127.98 319.54 78.98 148.91 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Model Selection according to IC and restrictions imposed based on F-tests and theory, see text for more details. 
 
 
 
less developed financial systems. Moreover, FDI in Pakistan averaged around 1.70% of GDP 
during our period of study while Pakistanis' abroad sent, around three times that amount. 
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Furthermore, net FDI inflows in Pakistan can be motivated by political rather than economic 
reasons. For example, the US, Pakistan’s biggest source of FDI inflows, often increased the 
FDI inflows during heightened period terrorism, due to Pakistan's role as its  "front line ally" 
against the Soviets in 1980s and against the Taliban insurgency in 2000s. This hypothesis is 
checked out in the VAR estimates in table 2, where terrorism is negatively associated with 
Worker Remittances’ and effect of terrorism on FDI is statistically insignificant. Moreover, 
coefficient estimates of real consumption are small and statistically insignificant (For further 
discussion of results in table 2 in light of the theoretical implications i - v outlined earlier see 
discussion of main findings section below).   
 For lag length selection, Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was considered which is 
particularly useful in small samples as it imposes a stricter penalty for loss of degrees of 
freedom relative to for example AIC (Swartz, 1978). Moreover, Inoue and Kilian (2006) 
compare asymptotic and finite sample properties of various model selecting criteria and 
conclude that traditional methods tend to over-select over-parameterized models while the 
BIC provides “the best approximating model among candidate models”. Moreover, Diebold 
(1998) also notes that the disadvantage of larger bias due to model misspecification is often 
not sufficiently large  in practice to justify a departure from consistent model selection 
procedure as BIC (see also Pesaran, Pick and Timmermann, 2011).  Hence, BIC is used for 
lag length selection which considers lag length of 1 as optimal fit with complexity.  
 
Table 3: VECM ESTIMATES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES D_ RGDP D_ TerrIndex D_ FDI D_ Rintrate D_ RExp 
      
Error Correctiont-1 -3.478*** -3.846 32.88*** -29.22 -32.66*** 
 (0.873) (6.630) (10.95) (23.88) (95.58) 
LD.RGDP 0.858 3.352 -2.107 22.32 84.01 
 (0.631) (4.787) (7.909) (17.24) (69.01) 
LD.TerrIndex 0.0266 -0.0469 -0.472 -0.195 2.734 
 (0.0346) (0.263) (0.434) (0.946) (3.788) 
LD.FDI -0.0217* 0.00275 0.285* -0.252 -2.518* 
 (0.0129) (0.0980) (0.162) (0.353) (1.413) 
LD.Rintrate -0.0131 -0.0466 0.118 -0.0241 -1.321 
 (0.0103) (0.0780) (0.129) (0.281) (1.125) 
LD.RExp -0.0134** -0.0191 0.0482 -0.341** -1.342** 
 (0.00615) (0.0467) (0.0772) (0.168) (0.673) 
Constant -0.00981 -0.0170 1.319*** 0.318 0.105 
 (0.0338) (0.256) (0.424) (0.924) (3.697) 
      
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Moreover, apart from the Granger-Causality tests, the unidirectional impact of terrorism to 
the macroeconomy can also be evaluated from a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
22
. 
Johansen (1998) has shown that although cointegration necessarily implies a long-run  
relationship but VECM can also identify the direction of that causality i.e. statistically 
significant error correction term(s) in VECM series can be taken as evidence for directional 
causality. The presence of cointegrating relationship enables one to do this (see section on 
robustness). Table 3 gives the VECM estimations. 
One can see that error correction term is significant for real GDP per capita, exports and FDI, 
however not so for terror index (and interest rate), implying the unidirectional causality from 
terrorism to the macroeconomy (which is also further evidenced by results Granger-Causality 
tests, see robustness section). Moreover, the magnitude of error correction term in the GDP 
per capita series imply that the adjustment is mainly driven by FDI and Exports where within 
the first year there is an adjustment of around 30 % towards the equilibrium. Additionally, as 
mentioned earlier, the statistical significance of lagged differences can be interpreted as 
short-run impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy. It is seen that lagged and differenced 
terrorism measure is statistically insignificant for the major macroeconomic series. Hence, 
the immediate or short-run impact of terrorism does not seem large. 
ROBUSTNESS
23
 
Two sets of robustness checks are performed. First are econometric stability checks which 
evaluates whether the causal interpretation of the terrorism to macroeconomy is indeed 
justified. Second, are economic robustness tests where control variables, other risk, crises and 
policy variables are added to the baseline equations of Table 2 to see if the results are 
overturned. 
Long run properties of a time series process, crucially depends upon the imposition of unit 
roots, and one runs the risk of interpreting our coefficients in a spurious regression, hence it 
becomes very important to test for unit roots in the variables. Chow tests to check for 
structural breaks were performed at optimal break points determined by Clemente-Montañés-
Reyes tests (Clemente, Montañés and Reyes, 1998).   The presence of structural breaks 
motivate us to perform  Clemente, Montañés and Reyes unit root test, this has additional 
advantage over Perron and Vogelsang (1992) unit root tests as it can take into account up to 
two break points when considering the presence of unit root. This is important as when there 
are structural breaks standard unit root test statistics are biased towards non rejection of a unit 
root (Enders, 2010). The tests find I (1) or a unit root in all but five variables.  Johansens 
cointegration test (1991) instead of Engle and Granger (1987) was performed which is more 
robust
24
 in a system of equations, the results of the test finds at least one cointegrating vectors 
in the all the independent series (see Table E1/E2 in A.2 for results). As a result, we can 
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 VECM estimates lagged differenced variables and error correction term(s) representing disequilibrium on the 
endogenous differenced variable. It is a restricted VAR, where restriction is imposed in the form of long-run 
relationship (See Enders, 2010 for more details). 
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 See Appendix for the mentioned tables and tests. 
24
 For a discussion of Johansens cointegration test and its advantages over Engle and Granger see Verbeek 
(2008) and Enders (2010). 
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assert that long run equilibrium relationship exists, and we can interpret the coefficients of 
our equations as long as they are integrated to the order 1, which is established by testing for 
unit root at first differences
25
.  
Wald tests for the null hypothesis of joint insignificance are rejected for the series at 1 per 
cent significance levels. Furthermore, Lagrange multiplier tests for VARs as mentioned in 
Johansens (1995) and Verbeek (2008) are performed. The tests fail to reject the nulls of (no) 
omitted variables, autocorrelation of residuals and homoskedasticity. The existence of long 
run equilibrium relationship as determined by results of Johansens cointegration test (1991) 
and subsequent I (1) of series, implies a temporal causality in at least one direction. To 
establish the direction and whether the terrorism improves forecasts for RGDP, Granger-
Causality tests are run. The result of Granger-Causality tests conclude unidirectional effect 
flowing from terrorism to the macroeconomic variables under study and not vice versa, see 
Table A in A.2. As can be seen from the table, inclusion of terrorism improves forecasts for 
all the macroeconomic variables under scrutiny.  As an additional robustness check that VAR 
might be spurious, first differences were taken to observe any change of signs and relative 
magnitude of variables (following Stock and Watson, 1993 advice). The signs of RGDP, 
RExp, RInv and RWrem remain negative. Furthermore, FDI and RCon is still statistically 
insignificant and coefficient of RGDP is greater than RExp, RInv and Wrem as in the original 
VAR, adding to the consistency of the estimates of the original VAR equation (see Table F).  
 To analyse the normality of residuals, Shapiro and Wilk (1965) tests are performed on 
individual time series. The results of the test fail to reject the null of normally distributed 
residuals, though this is interesting given the small sample and is also a validation for the 
choice of the Quasi-Structural VAR technique.  Stability of residuals are checked  by 
applying cumulative sum of recursive residuals square (CUSUMSQ) test as suggested by 
Pesaran & Pesaran (1997) and Galpin & Hawkins (1984). The advantage of this is that, 
unlike the Chow test that requires break point(s) to be specified, it can be used without any 
prior knowledge of the structural break point and it provides reliable results even if departure 
from constancy of residuals is sudden and haphazard. As can be seen from figure H in A.2, 
the residuals remain in the confidence interval and hence fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
parameter stability. 
As far as economic robustness checks are concerned, different approaches are taken here.   
Figure 8 gives the evolution of terrorist risk and political risk indices from 1995 to 2010. 
Political risk index developed by Political Risk Services Group (PRSG) quantifies 12 
indicators of political risk, based on detailed country reports and expert assessments of 
various factors that are fundamental to the economy.  For example, the index incorporates 
corruption, property rights, labour costs, barriers to international trade, efficiency of the 
judicial and taxation system etc (see PRSG website and A.1 for more details).  One can see 
from the figure, that although terrorism has continued to increase post 9/11, these institutional 
factors remain essentially stable. Contrary to expectations, the correlation coefficient is 
actually negative, where factors such as corruption and lack of property rights are associated 
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 All ADF and PP tests reject the null of unit root at 1 % significance levels for first differences. 
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with decreased instead of increased terrorism. Hence, one can be reasonably assume that 
these economic factors do not to endogenize the current results
26
. 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of Terrorist and Political risk index over time (Source: PRSG and SBP). 
 
Moreover, a bi-variate VAR for RGDP and Terror Index according to information criteria is 
also run (see Table D in A.2). The coefficient of terrorism index is negative and with similar 
magnitude to the baseline VAR specification (0.089 relative to benchmark 0.093 in table 2). 
The similarity of terror index coefficients in bi-variate regressions in Table D and 
unrestricted VAR in Table 2 also mitigates the concern of omitted variable bias, as terrorist 
attacks might in fact be interpreted as exogenous shocks to the economy, hence additional 
control variables only improves precision, not coefficient estimates. This is exactly in line 
with the consensus in empirical literature relating terrorism and income. Almost all
27
 
empirical (case studies and cross country analyses), fail to build a case for negative 
relationship between terrorism and growth (See Abadie, 2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; 
Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Feldman and Ruffle, 2007).  Krueger and Maleckova (2003) 
interestingly relate terrorism to voting behaviour and conclude that terrorism is a “political, 
not an economic phenomenon” (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.142). Hence, economic 
variables do not determine the level of terrorism in a given country and the causal 
interpretation from terrorism to the macroeconomy can be justified.  
Moreover, Bodie (1982) and Levine et al (2001) document that inflation is particularly 
important for the real economy and may have direct impact on macroeconomic variables 
under study.  Busse and Hefeker (2007) extends this line of research and suggest that 
inflation may actually proxy the quality of macroeconomic policy, as low inflation is 
particularly associated with sound macroeconomic fundamentals and policy. Colacito and 
Croce (2011) on the other hand, demonstrate that exchange rate risk and shocks might be 
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inclusion of the political index in the VAR estimates. 
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particularly detrimental for exports and hence long run growth prospects. Moreover, Reinhart 
and Carlos (1996) combines these two views and show how exchange rate and inflation risk 
combine to have a reinforcing effect, precipitating large depreciations and crises particularly 
in developing countries. In line with this, in addition to incorporating structural breaks in 
form of year dummies as determined by Clemente et al (1998) tests, measures incorporating 
exchange rate and inflation risk are added to the base line equations to assess the validity of 
results. Table 6 gives the results (See Appendix A.1 for explanation on construction of these 
variables). 
It can be seen from column 1 of Table 6 that as expected inflation risk enters with a 
statistically significant negative sign. The results are essentially the same with negative 
coefficient of terrorism and positive impact of FDI, real interest rate. However, the obvious 
multicollinearity between exchange rate risk and real exports have greatly decreased the 
precision of real exports, rendering it statistically insignificant
28
.  
Following the Augmented Solow model, measures of human capital: primary, secondary, 
university enrolment rates were added as explanatory variables; together and separately to 
assess the validity of coefficient estimates (Column 2 through 4). Primary equation levels 
seem to be particularly positively related to real GDP with statistical significant coefficient 
estimates. However, with the data at hand secondary and tertiary enrolment is statistically 
insignificant. This might be due to limited data, particularly only 31 observations for 
exchange rate. Lastly, as various structural breaks might bias the coefficient estimates. 
Column 5 of Table 6 estimates the baseline equation with year dummies representing 
structural breaks. The break points were determined by statistical significance of break points 
in the series as opposed to arbitrary imposition at various important years (based Clemente et 
al (1998) tests). This gave structural break points for year 1980, 1996, 2002 (both innovation 
and additive outlier approaches were used). This also makes economic sense as 1996 was the 
year when the negative shock of the Asian crisis hit Pakistan, while 2002 was year of 
economic reforms including large-scale privatizations undertaken by the Musharraf regime. 
The structural break coefficient is marginally significant and enters with a negative sign. This  
is probably due to the positive effect of 2002 reformed nullified by the large Asian crisis 
shock of 1996. Lastly, to evaluate whether the fall in macroeconomic variables is explained 
by the recent financial crisis, a crisis dummy (CRDUM) that takes the value of 1 for the crisis 
years of 2007 and 2008  is also included in the baseline regression (column 6). The results are 
extremely similar with terrorism again entering with a negative sign while the coefficient 
estimate for the recent crisis dummy insignificant at conventional significance levels (with a 
p-value of 0.49).  This makes sense as the poorly developed financial markets in Pakistan 
prevented the propagation of the financial crisis to credit markets in Pakistan. Moreover, loss 
in exports which can and did hurt the Pakistani economy is already included and hence 
controlled for in the regressions. Additionally, to access whether the negative effects of 
terrorism diminishes, a quadratic term of terrorism index was added to the baseline 
regression. 
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 Drop in number of observations from 36 to 31 is due to lesser data for exchange rate risk variable. 
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Table 6: Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP RGDP 
       
L.RGDP -0.0140 0.412 0.468 0.676 -0.131 0.540 
 (0.582) (0.739) (0.719) (0.868) (0.580) (0.770) 
L. TerrIndex -0.0622** -0.0763** -0.0647* -0.0649* -0.0598** -0.0712** 
 (0.0267) (0.0309) (0.0310) (0.0317) (0.0264) (0.0321) 
L.FDI 0.0352*** 0.0124 0.0107 0.0181 0.0362*** 0.0196 
 (0.00937) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0217) (0.00926) (0.0177) 
L. Rint 0.0228*** 0.0256*** 0.0266*** 0.0235** 0.0258*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.00786) (0.00768) (0.00750) (0.0102) (0.00809) (0.00791) 
L. RExp 0.00619 -0.000542 -0.00195 -0.00300 0.00716 -0.00186 
 (0.00549) (0.00784) (0.00768) (0.00818) (0.00546) (0.00816) 
 ExrateRisk -0.00159 -0.0292 -0.0986 -0.0670 0.0204 -0.00638 
 (0.0953) (0.0932) (0.102) (0.126) (0.0955) (0.0999) 
InflationRisk -0.441*** -0.384** -0.419** -0.421** -0.455*** -0.340* 
 (0.141) (0.160) (0.157) (0.160) (0.139) (0.174) 
L.Primary Enrolment  0.0542* 0.125** 0.126**  0.0500* 
  (0.0260) (0.0544) (0.0556)  (0.0270) 
L. Secondary 
Enrolment  
  -0.0802 -0.0830   
   (0.0548) (0.0563)   
L. Tertiary Enrolment    -0.0112   
    (0.0249)   
Structural Breaks     -0.0986  
     (0.0763)  
CRDUM      -0.113 
      (0.160) 
Constant 0.973 -3.306 -3.393 -2.542 1.048* -3.227 
 (0.570) (2.259) (2.198) (2.933) (0.565) (2.291) 
       
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.949 0.958 0.962 0.962 0.953 0.959 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, the statistically insignificance of the coefficient estimates fail to find any evidence 
of a diminishing effect. It should also be noted that although at some specifications the 
magnitude of terrorism coefficient is somewhat reduced relative to the base line specification 
of equation (4). Nevertheless, the results are still interpreted from the baseline due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, in the robustness checks the number of observations fall by  
around 15 % due to inclusion of exchange rate risk variable. Moreover, there are further 
losses of degrees of freedom with inclusion of more variables in the form of unrestricted 
equations. Lastly, the cumulative loss of terrorism (with the robustness equation) is within the 
range of 25.83 % to 39.95 % of the base line equation. 
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  From the results of robustness tests, one can conclude that even in a relatively small sample, 
the estimates are stable, reliable and the causal interpretation taken here is not far-fetched.  
 
COUNTER FACTUAL EXPERIMENTS 
 The counter-factual experiments serve to calculate the cost of post 9/11 terrorism. One of the 
main reasons that assessing the costs of terrorism and conflict in general is difficult is 
because of the difficulty to ascertain how the economy and its agents would behave in 
absence of conflict. The use of VAR is particularly helpful in this regard, as information set 
can be extended to include more variables that can affect the evolution of the economy.  A 
counter-factual experiment where terrorism continues at the same (much lower) intensity of 
pre 9/11 levels is performed. The counter-factual is obtained by asking VAR to predict when 
terror index takes the much lower pre 9/11 average. This is in turn compared with VAR 
estimates of actual (much higher) terrorism and actual GDP growth. This provides a scientific 
base, amidst the random flurry of estimates by politicians, media personnel and government, 
of estimating the costs of post 9/11 terrorism in Pakistan. Figure 5 gives the result of VAR 
predictions.  It can be seen from Figure 5 that the VAR when asked to predict GDP for post 
9/11 in absence of intense terrorism of 2000s as shown in Figure 1, clearly shows an upward 
trend. Furthermore, it is seen that the sudden drop in GDP cannot be explained if we use 
average values of terrorism index in the equations. Interestingly, out of sample prediction for 
2009 and 2010 seem to be highly accurate (as GDP data is available till 2010) and sudden fall 
in GDP cannot be explained unless we add the terrorism measure in the specification.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Real Output per capita growth with predicted and actual patterns [Source: SBP, GTD and own 
computations]. 
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The table below gives yearly and total losses of Real GDP per capita growth from the above 
exercise at 95% confidence interval bands with lower and upper bounds (LB and UB, 
respectively). 
Table 4: Terrorism Losses Post 9/11 
YearsY 
RGDP  
With 
Average 
Terrorism 
LB 
RGDP with 
Average 
Terrorism 
UB 
Actual 
GDP 
Prediction 
with 
Intense post 
9/11 
Terrorism Loss LB % Loss UB % Year 
2001 - - 3.95715 - - - 
 2002 4.04476 4.4407239 3.95818 4.02 0.086580 0.482544 
 2003 4.10070 4.5664644 4.04605 3.93 0.054646 0.520414 
 2004 4.16172 4.6486713 3.69207 3.9 0.469650 0.956601 
 2005 4.21337 4.6973023 3.66045 3.61 0.552918 1.036852 
 2006 4.26179 4.7498902 3.77139 3.79 0.490395 0.9785 
 2007 4.31265 4.8111745 3.83629 3.84 0.476363 0.974885 
 2008 4.36877 4.8808987 3.48207 3.8 0.886704 1.398829 
 2009 4.43047 4.9573893 2.90163 2.85 1.52883
 P
 2.05575
 P
 
 2010 4.49674 5.038587 0.71034 2.44 3.78639
 P
 4.32823
 P
 
 2011 4.56625 5.1229354 n/a 1.73 2.84060
P
 3.39728
P
 
 
    
Total Loss 
with 
available 
data:        8.332 12.733 
 
 
 
                                           Predicted loss till 2011:                 11.173               16.129 
         Note: Predicted losses till 2011 is based on out of sample forecasts [Source: SBP, GTD and own computations]. 
 It is estimated that if Pakistan was not engulfed in the intense wave of suicide terrorism in 
2009 and 2010 that killed 2868, the real GDP per capita of Pakistan would have grown by 
around 5.32 to 6.38 at (95 percent confidence intervals) in these two years (see Table 3). 
Furthermore, the total for the past 10 years is at most 16.13 per cent of real GDP per capita 
growth which is tantamount to 6.32 billion US dollars (see  Table B1 in A.2). Similar, 
patterns of reduction of Investment and Exports is also observed and a drop in Investment 
and Exports is not seen unless we bring the data for high terrorism of 2000s into the picture 
see pictorial illustration of the VAR predictions with exports as dependent variable below: 
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Figure 6. Real Export growth predicted and actual patterns [Source: SBP, GTD and own computations]. 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, out of sample predictions (2009/2010) are good. If we 
exclude the particularly high terrorism years of late 2000s, the actual drop is left unexplained. 
It is estimated that post 9/11 terrorism reduced the Investment and Exports of Pakistan by 
5.71 and 10.5 per cent
29
, respectively (see also Table B2/3 in A.2).  
 
PERSISTENT EFFECT OF TERRORISM 
  The increasing of lags in the VAR system to judge the persistence of terrorism not only 
violates the information criteria but are very sensitive to alternative specifications (probably 
due to loss in degrees of freedom given the  sample size). It is statistically more appropriate 
to judge the persistence of the negative effect of terrorism on macroeconomic variables under 
study by observing the Impulse response functions (IRF). The restrictions (as determined by 
joint significance) are identical to those in VAR estimates. The IRFs here measures the 
response of macroeconomic variables for an impulse of terrorism, keeping constant all other 
variables i.e. IRFs are responses of macroeconomic variables with respect to terrorism 
shocks. Standard orthogonal impulse responses with one unit shocks (as opposed to 
generalized impulse responses) are applied due to its simplicity and robustness (Jacobs and 
Wallis, 2005). Figures 7 gives the plots of impulse response functions for an impulse of 
terrorism on RGDP. It can be seen that impulse of terrorism lasts a little over 2 years (as it 
becomes statistically insignificant afterwards). Similar is the case for real investments with 
the negative effect of terrorism again lasting for around 2 years (Figure K2 in A.2).  The most 
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dramatic IRF result is for worker remittances, with subsequently induced shocks remaining 
negatively statistically significant until year 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Impulse Response of  Real GDP and Worker Remmitances on Terrorism from 2008 onwards
30
. 
This implies that the effect of terrorism in Pakistan is long-lasting, though more accurate 
estimation would be possible if monthly or quarterly data was available. This is indeed a 
staggering finding as estimates by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) indicated that the negative 
effect of terrorism on exports, investment and GDP in Israel lasted as little as a single quarter. 
This may be a result of several factors, one of them being that Pakistan is a developing 
country, with GDP per capita is around 1/27 times that of Israel  and its institutions and the 
economy less equipped to deal with external shocks (WDI, 2012). The implication of the 
finding is that even if terrorism came to sudden halt in Pakistan, the negative effects would 
take some time to dissipate, especially for Worker Remittances, where workers would not 
send money to Pakistan for around 5 years after terrorism has seized. The authorities would 
need to take additional steps and make a credible commitment that the improvement in 
security situation in the country is here to stay.   
 
Intervention Analysis 
  Given the recent anti-war on terror sentiment in Pakistan (Gallup survey, 2011) and dismal 
performance of economy of Pakistan over the recent past, politicians and the media have 
given considerable attention to economic consequences of  9/11.  The impact of 9/11 on the 
economy of Pakistan has come to light recently with IMF and Finance Ministry of Pakistan 
(2011) each publishing a report one the cost of post 9/11 terrorism. These estimates range 
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 Each step represent years forward from 2008 onwards,  where step one is 2009, step 2 year 2010 and so forth 
and CI is the confidence interval. 
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from US $ 60 to 70 billion, each relying on estimates by government officials and at times 
politicians on various sectors of the economy (IMF PPRP, 2010; PES, 2011).  The kind of 
unidirectional temporal causality observed through Granger Causality tests and VECM, 
makes the use of intervention analysis an effective statistical tool to gauge whether, the 
intervention of 9/11 had any significant effect on the evolution of GDP of Pakistan. This 
methodology is essentially a reproduction of impact of 9/11 on the US economy (see e.g. 
Becker and Murphy, 2001 and IMF, 2001) for the case of Pakistan. This also serves as a 
robustness check for the results of counterfactual scenarios above. Three scenarios are 
introduced in the RGDP VAR equation (4) of Table 2.  The first, with Interv1 variable is 
when the impulse of 9/11 is transitory and only lasts for one time period i.e. in 2002 only
31
. 
The second case of inclusion of Interv2 is when effect of 9/11 is not assumed transitory and 
the intervention variable takes the value of 1 from the year 2002 onwards (and zero 
otherwise). The last scenario is the intervention as a gradual adjustment, which is probably 
most appropriate as terrorism gradually rose post 9/11 and so does the intervention variable 
(interv3) here where it achieves the value of unity at the peak year of terrorism.  
The results are presented in Table 5 where as before terrorism, FDI and exports take the 
statistically significant hypothesized signs with the intervention 2 and 3 entering with 
statistically significant and large negative signs. It can be seen for example when effect of 
9/11 is assumed fleeting, no statistical relation emerges as terrorism does not have any impact 
on real GDP, similar result is found for an intervention of 9/11 on GDP of US (in Enders and 
Sandler, 2006), yet case 2 and 3 find negative statistical association of terrorism and GDP, 
with the magnitude of case 3 being around 62 percent greater than case 2. This makes sense 
as it took till 2004 for Pakistan to fully participate in the “war against terror” and launch a 
full-fledged military operation which is thought to incur the wrath of all militant splinter 
groups fighting US along the Afghan border.  The effect of 9/11 on the economy of Pakistan, 
being thousands of miles away from the twin towers, is around -0.35% of GDP, around 10 
times the estimates by Becker and Murphy (2001) and IMF (2001) for the effect of 9/11 on 
US, the direct and immediate victim of the 9/11 terrorist events. 
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 As 9/11 attacks are hypothesized to have an indirect and lagged effect on the economy of Pakistan, the year 
after 2001 is considered. More details on the intervention variable can be found in A.1. 
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DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS 
 It is derived from coefficient estimates of VAR (0.093), changes in terrorism index (631 %) 
and increase in Real GDP per capita (119 %) that real GDP per capita in Pakistan would have 
grown by [(0.093 x 631) + (119)] = 177.7 % from 1973 to 2008 if there been no terrorism for  
Table 5: Intervention Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES RGDP RGDP RGDP 
    
L.RGDP -0.95 -0.62 -0.34 
 (0.666) (0.603) (0.612) 
L.TerrIndex -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.11*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) 
L.FDI 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 
 (0.088) (0.082) (0.083) 
L.Rintrate 0.20** 0.08 0.07 
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.095) 
L.RExp 1.61** 1.46** 1.11* 
 (0.625) (0.553) (0.560) 
Interv3   -0.35** 
   (0.138) 
Interv1 -0.08   
 (0.176)   
Interv2  -0.22**  
  (0.102)  
Constant 1.99*** 1.57** 1.31** 
 (0.618) (0.581) (0.591) 
    
Observations 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.94 0.95 0.95 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
our period of study, this is a direct loss of 33.02 % due to terrorism
32
. Furthermore, from the 
IRFs we see that impulse of terrorism lasts at least as long as 2-3 years for most 
macroeconomic variables in Pakistan.  
VAR estimates also show that post 9/11 drop in real GDP cannot be explained unless we 
include a measure of terrorism. Counterfactuals experiments on post 9/11 scenarios indicate 
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 Calculated by comparing actual real GDP per capita growth (119 %) and hypothetical GDP growth without 
terrorism (177.7 percent) from 1973 to 2008 i.e. 
         
      
        (see main results for more details). 
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that had terrorism stayed its pre-9/11 levels, RGDP, RExp, RInv
33
 would be 11.2, 10.5 and 
5.71 percent higher, respectively. The counterfactual experiment on the particularly violent 
wave of terrorism of 2009 and 2010 that killed more than 2500 people predicts a loss of 
5.32% of real per capita GDP in these two years. In hard currency terms the war on terror has 
cost Pakistan a loss of 6.32 billion US dollars in real income alone.  
 From the intervention analysis, it was observed that the impulse of 9/11 exerts a statistically 
significant and large negative impact of -0.35 % on GDP per capita. This is an interesting 
finding as Enders and Sandler (2006) note that bi-directional causality at some lags and the 
fact that US was already entering a recession in 2001 made it difficult to isolate the fall in 
GDP due to the intervention of 9/11. The same cannot be said for Pakistan as the economy 
was actually beginning to boom in 2000s. Moreover, from Granger causality tests, bi-
directional causality could not be determined at different lag lengths in addition to lag length 
selection according to information criteria.  This is further corroborated by VECM estimates, 
where the absence of short and long-run relationship was documented from the 
macroeconomy to terrorism. 
 Prediction of Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) model are fulfilled in at least two counts with 
terrorism being negatively associated with real income and investment (implication i), though 
effect on private consumption (RCon) is insignificant (hence implication iii is not satisfied), 
which is also documented elsewhere (see for example Persitz, 2005; ET, 2004; Rubinstein 
and Becker, 2004). This can probably be explained by positive substitution effect of higher 
consumption and negative income effect of lower consumption cancelling each other out in 
face of increased terrorism risk. It is also interesting to note that Government spending is 
negatively associated with terrorism, significant at conventional levels, which is in stark 
violation of ET (2004) prediction of a positive relation between terrorism and government 
spending (implication ii). It was reasoned that an increase in terrorism would raise 
government spending through an increase in military spending. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008 
and 2009) document this phenomenon, where high terrorism incidence is associated with 
larger government spending. However, these analyses fail to take into account host of factors. 
Firstly, their cross-county analysis fail to take into account time-variant heterogeneity. This 
becomes particularly alarming as they base their studies on long time horizons. As was 
outlined in Historical Background and Overview section above, various economic reforms,  
internal and external shocks, influences the nature of terrorism, institutions of the country and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. These factors need to be explicitly analysed when analysing 
terrorism and its long term macroeconomic consequences (This is done in Robustness section 
below, where crises, risk and structural break variables are constructed and added in the 
baseline equations to evaluate the sensitivity of results in Table 2). Moreover, the 
aforementioned analyses often impose unrealistic strict exogeneity assumptions on the 
variables (through using random and fixed effect methods) and fail to take into account the 
useful information of past terrorism and macroeconomic variables.  
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This ‘paradoxical’ outcome of negative effect of terrorism on government spending may be 
due to at least three reasons (there is clearly a need to model these factors formally to get a 
more holistic picture of terror and government spending). First, ET (2004) do not take into 
account long run impact of terrorism on the economy when considering this lemma, as 
terrorism might cripple the income of the country so much making the government unable to 
respond by spending more on the military (hence, there might be willingness but not the 
ability to respond). Second, variation in government or military spending very roughly 
captures the 'counter-terrorism expenditures' which ET (2004) emphasise on. Data for 
military spending was available though it was limited to 1988 onwards; the strong correlation 
coefficient of 0.94 between military and government spending (probably because of direct 
military interventions and large influence of the army in domestic politics) and the data 
limitation caused us to quote and interpret only the regression with government spending. 
Lastly, the model implicitly assumes that all governments consciously act to maximise 
societal welfare which is not the case (see e.g. Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin), where conflicts 
between the populace and the governments’ interests arise. This effect is more pronounced 
for developing countries. Hence, the negative impact of terrorism and government spending 
is not counter-intuitive as emphasized. 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) use FDI as their endogenous variable in their cross country 
regressions to analyse open economy channel of terrorism and find evidence in support of 
their hypothesis. Adverse effect of terrorism on FDI could not be ascertained for Pakistan 
with alternate specifications and lag length selections
34
. This does not mean that losses of 
terrorism through the open economy channel are insubstantial. The statistical insignificance 
of FDI may be due to the aforementioned reason of FDI in Pakistan being motivated by 
political rather than economic considerations.  Careful scrutiny of other variables that are 
influenced by open economy channels find support of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) 
hypothesis (implication iv). Workers’ Remittances (WRem) from abroad and foreign exports 
are hit hard by terrorism (see table 2). Effect of terrorism on Workers Remittances is not only 
unique, but also neglected so far, while studying macroeconomic impact of terrorism. This 
might also be a developing country specific effect. Apart from the fastest growing developing 
countries, such as China and India, foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP is often 
very low for most developing countries (see for example WDI of World Bank), hence WRem 
might be an important avenue hit by terrorism in developing countries in such cases.  The 
magnitude and persistence of WRem is also noteworthy with 5 times the magnitude of losses 
in foreign exports and almost equal to the loss of real investment and the negative effect 
lasting for around 5 years. As outlined earlier, AG (2008) fail to test for short-run impact of 
terrorism, however, the data at hand allowed the evaluation of AG (2008) hypothesis, by the 
means of VECM (implication v). Based on the statistically insignificant lagged, differenced 
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 Bi-variate VAR of terrorism and FDI (not shown) with monthly observations at some lags for the period of 
2002-2007 does become marginally significant.  
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terrorism measure in the VECM (see Table 3), one finds evidence for implication v  i.e.  the 
immediate or short-run impact of terrorism on the macroeconomy is negligible
35
. 
It is also important to discuss the limitations of this study. First, there might be omitted 
variable bias due to the Quasi-Structural VAR specification. However, similarity of terrorist 
coefficient estimates in unrestricted model and bi-variate VAR, resilience of coefficient 
estimates to inclusion of various policy and risk variables show that this might not be 
exceptionally detrimental as terrorism might in fact be exogenous. Moreover, as opposed to 
the conventional wisdom hypothesis that emphasizes on the economic roots of terrorism, 
empirics of terrorism often fail to find any robust negative relationship between terrorism and 
income growth. For example, Krueger (2007) shows by analysing extensive microeconomic 
data that there is no systematic negative relationship flowing from low incomes to terrorism. 
Moreover, he shows that as certain level of human capital is needed to perpetrate terrorist 
acts, terrorist in fact are recruited from relatively wealthy and educated households. In a 
much broader survey, Gassebner and Luechinger  (2011), by running 13.4 million different 
regressions and using combinations of 65 variables from 43 different studies also document 
no significant causal effects of income on terrorism. More important in the current context, 
Fair (2008) documents a similar phenomenon in Pakistan, by utilizing data on killed 
militants’ families, she finds that militants are conversely recruited from middle class and 
well educated families. This is further corroborated by Blair, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro 
(2012) who find evidence of a higher support base of terrorism from the relatively wealthy. In 
a robust survey of 6000 individuals across Pakistan where item non-response and social 
desirability biases (inherent in this kind of study) is explicitly corrected,  it is found that the 
poor are actually much more averse (23 times) to extremist violence relative to middle class 
citizens. 
  Second, it might also be the case that the effect of terrorism is not effectively segregated 
from other forms of conflicts. But with no war during the period of study, and the robust 
coding of terrorist incidents by GTD, one can justify the interpretation of results as impact of 
terrorism instead of conflict
36
. Furthermore, Crenshaw (1991) in her seminal contribution to 
political theory of terrorism also suggested internal conflict might in fact determine terrorism, 
hence the distinction might in fact be unnecessary. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The chain reaction in the form of war of terrorism, triggered by the tragic events of 9/11 had 
profound impact on Pakistan. The article has highlighted the economic impact of terrorism on 
major macroeconomic variables. Ironically, neither the 9/11 attacks were planned in Pakistan, 
nor were any of the 19
 
hijackers involved in the incident were from Pakistan or had Pakistani 
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 These results are robust even if we use strictly restricted models based on ET (2004) and AG (2008) i.e. 
excluding the WRem, Exports, FDI and including only ET (2004) variables and vice versa. However, given the 
small sample, unrestricted models  are used to gain efficiency. 
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 In the robustness checks and Figure 8 below, one can also see political risk index which incorporates internal 
conflicts do not increase at times of high terrorism. 
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origins (9/11 Commission Staff Statement, Chapter 2), yet Pakistani economy was most 
severely hit by the intense and more importantly recurring terrorist attacks in its economic 
hubs. Though Pakistan is a large country
37
, but like most developing countries its production 
facilities are few and spatially concentrated, where most of the terrorism took place. Its 
ability to absorb macroeconomic shocks is limited, hence the multitude of IMF rescues. 
Furthermore, the finding of terrorism affect on the macroeconomy lasting for as long as 2 
years is also consistent with Pakistan’s sensitivity and vulnerability to shocks hypothesis. 
Though it is not an exhaustive study on the economic impact of terrorism in Pakistan by any 
means, for example the article omits loss of estimate of compensation to victims and 
refugees, effects on financial markets, defence expenditures
38
, loss of tax revenues etc 
(mainly due to data limitations), but it does highlight the effect of terrorism on major 
macroeconomic variables and it is expected that aforementioned losses should be translated 
in losses in real GDP. The study estimates the direct cost of post 9/11 terrorism to be around 
7 billion in US dollars. Moreover, it is documented that cumulatively terrorism has cost 
Pakistan around 33.02 % of its real national income which is equivalent to approximately a 
loss of 1% of real GDP per capita every year. This is alarming for a country ranked 127
th
 at 
UN Human Development Index with 22.6 % of population living on less than 1.25 dollars a 
day (UN Statistics, 2011).  With around, 40% of population below the age of 15 (World 
Bank, 2011), hence a huge potential to benefit from the so-called demographic gift. Pakistan 
needs an early end to this war, if it can not materialise; it definitely needs a major revamping 
of its exporting sector and to take steps to encourage domestic investments and worker 
remittances. 
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 Ranked 6
th
 most populous country in the world (CIA World Fact Book, 2011). 
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 According to Statistics made available by SBP (Central Bank of Pakistan) ratio of defense to GDP has 
actually fallen post 9/11, probably due to strengthening of the peace process in 2001 with India (see figure J in 
A.2).  
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Variable Description and Sources 
TerrIndex: Terrorism Index = ln[exp(1) + Average of total yearly incidents, deaths and 
injuries] where the data was obtained from the  Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
RGDP: Log of Nominal GDP per capita per year from Central Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
deflated by its own chained price index. 
RInvestment (RInv): Log of nominal Gross Fixed Capital Formation per capita from Central 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) deflated by CPI. GFCF would respond better to change in investment 
patterns due to various shocks in contrast to gross investment. 
RExports (RExp):  Real Exports per capita deflated by CPI from SBP. 
Wrem: Log of Workers' Remittances from Abroad per capita deflated by CPI from SBP. 
FDI: Log of FDI per capita deflated by CPI  from SBP. 
GovExp: Log of  nominal government expenditure in a given year deflated by CPI  from 
SBP. 
RCon: Log of real private consumption per capita deflated by CPI from SBP. 
School Enrol: Primary, secondary and university enrolment, normalized by age cohort from 
Pakistan Education Survey (various issues)
39
. 
Inflation: Year on Year inflation rate as measured by changes in consumer price index from 
SBP. 
RIntrate: Real Call money rate representing real interest rate {Nominal interest is converted 
to real by conventional formula of Real Interest = (1+nominal interest)/ (1+inflation rate)} 
from SBP. 
Interv1: The intervention variable that the takes value of 1 in 2002 and 0 in all other periods. 
Interv2: The intervention variable takes value of 1 from 2002-2008 and 0 otherwise. 
Interv3:  The intervention variable takes the value of 0.14 in 2002 and linearly increases to 
take value of 1 in 2008 the peak year for terrorism to date, and 0 for all other years.  
InflationRisk: It takes the value of 1 for high inflation years i.e. when inflation is one standard 
deviation above mean. 
ExRateRisk: It takes the value of 1 for  sudden changes in exchange rates  i.e. when exchange rate 
is one standard deviation above mean or below mean. 
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PolRiskIndex: This  index taken from Political Risk services group evaluates 12 factors in an 
economy: Turmoil, Restrictions on equity, Restrictions on local operations, Taxation discrimination, 
Repatriation restrictions, Exchange controls, Tariff barriers, Nontariff  barriers, Payment delays, 
Expansionary economic policies, Labor costs, Foreign debt based on detailed country reports and 
expert assessments. Moreover, the index is divided by 10 for all years for ease of  graphical 
comparison with terror index. 
A.2  Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Engle-Granger Causality 
 
      
       Exogenous Variables" 
 
      
Dependent  
Variable 
L.TerrIndex  L.RGDP/L.RInv/L.RExp/L.Wrem  
     
RGDP -0.093*** 
(9.62) 
 -  
     
TerrIndex -  0.110 
(0.977) 
 
     
      
RInv 
 
 
TerrIndex                                              
 
 
 
-0.054** 
 (6.33) 
 
-
   - 
 
 
0.197 
(0.825) 
 
 
 
      
     
RExp 
 
 
TerrIndex 
 
-0.010* 
(4.14) 
 
- 
 - 
 
0.003 
(0.04) 
 
     
      
     
Wrem 0.05*** 
(12.75) 
 -  
     
TerrIndex 
 
-  0.005 
(0.05) 
 
 
                
     "F-Statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Engle-Granger Causality 
 
      
Exogenous Variables" 
 
      
Dependent  
Variable 
L.TerrIndex  L.GovExp/L.RCon/L.FDI  
     
GovExp -0.012*  -  
 (4.09)    
TerrIndex -  0.03 
(0.81) 
 
     
     
      
RCon 
 
TerrIndex 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 
 
 - 
 
0.09 
(0.21) 
 
     
  
FDI 
 
TerrIndex 
 
 
0.014 
(1.78) 
- 
  
- 
 
2.00 
 
     
"F-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B1: RGDP Losses 
2001 RGDP 
Loss in RGDP 
(%) 
RGDP in Loss in Billion 
Rs Exchange rate
40
 
Billion $ 
US 
2002 28015 0.4825439 13518.46736 61.4349 0.220045 
2003 29389 0.5204144 15294.4588 58.5034 0.261428 
2004 30363 0.9566013 29045.28527 57.5826 0.504411 
2005 32587 1.0368523 33787.9059 59.3576 0.569226 
2006 33904 0.9785002 33175.07078 59.87564 0.554066 
2007 35154 0.9748845 34271.08971 60.64102 0.565147 
2008 35106 1.3988287 49107.28034 62.62875 0.784101 
2009 35908 2.055751782 73817.93498 78.61953 0.938926 
2010 37309 4.32823946 161482.286 83.87801 1.925204 
  
Total Loss: 443.499780 
 
6.322555 
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Table B2: Investment losses 
Year 
GFCF with 
Average 
Terrorism Actual GFCF 
Prediction with Intense post 9/11 
Terrorism Loss % GFCF Loss Million $ US 
2001 3.16619 3.16619 3.16619 
  2002 3.456001 3.15136 3.205855 0.3046419 23.98444165 
2003 3.627957 3.22943 3.113857 0.3985279 30.68406409 
2004 3.740155 2.87747 3.005027 0.8626856 64.97583395 
2005 3.818735 2.91027 2.935731 0.9084655 66.93838636 
2006 3.868643 3.1008 3.175746 0.7678438 55.35842977 
2007 3.920827 3.16608 3.312657 0.7547477 53.24854845 
2008 3.980178 3.48207 3.370569 0.4981081 34.39352964 
2009 4.046849 3.70127 3.226439 0.3455795 23.35227715 
2010 4.119641 N/A 3.5513572 0.568284
P 
 2011 4.196846 N/A 3.886676 0.310170
P 
   
 
  Total Loss with available data: 4.8406 352.9355111 
  
       
       
  
Predicted Loss till 2011 5.7190551 
  
Table B3:  Real Exports losses 
Year 
Exp with 
Average 
Terrorism 
Actual Exp 
Growth 
Prediction with Intense 
post 9/11 Terrorism 
Loss % 
Exp 
Loss Million $ 
US 
2001 
     2002 3.1815539 3.14975 3.193668 0.031804 2.01492329 
2003 3.260799 3.27354 3.126776 0 0 
2004 3.3308739 2.89699 3.119721 0.433884 35.5649995 
2005 3.3925321 2.86381 2.835525 0.528722 49.2085886 
2006 3.4481158 2.97098 2.967906 0.477136 48.0007568 
2007 3.5053295 2.99744 3.018854 0.50789 53.3415948 
2008 3.5665815 2.59106 2.982177 0.975522 116.949564 
2009 3.6324969 2.05167 1.855672 1.776825 200.135443 
2010 3.7021796 N/A
41
 1.3155552 2.38662
P 
 2011 3.7745054 N/A 0.3984027 3.37610
P 
 
   
Total Loss with available 
data: 2.954957 305.080427 
      
      
   
Predicted Loss till 2011 10.49451 
 
                                                             
41 N/A represents data not available. 
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Table-C: Clemente-Montanes-Reyes Detrended Structural Break Unit Root Test  
Variable Innovative Outliers Additive Outlier 
t-statistic TB1 TB2 Decision t-statistic TB1 TB2 Decision 
tRGDPln  -4.179 1980 1996 I(0) -6.145* 1996 2002 I(1) 
tFDIln  -6.115* 1977 1984 I(0) -8.111* 1984 1994 I(1) 
tRConln  -1.246* 1992 2001 I(0) -3.225 1990 2000 I(1) 
tGovExpln  -4.212 1980 1996 I(0) -4.117 1982 1996 I(1) 
tTerIndex  -5.871** 1977 1984 I(0) -3.426 1983 1987 I(1) 
tREXPln  -3.495 1980 1996 I(0) -6.655* 1978 2002 I(1) 
tRInvln  -3.675 1980 1996 I(0) -5.861** 1978 2002 I(1) 
tRInte  -4.621 1996 2000 I(0) -5.908** 1977 2000 I(1) 
tWremln  -6.761* 1994 2000 I(0) -5.590** 1980 2000 I(1) 
tInflationln  -2.480 1996 2002 I(0) -2.608 1991 1995 I(0) 
Note: * & ** indicates significant at 1% & 5% level of significance respectively. 
 
Result:  Five variables are I(0) while rest are I(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table D: Bi-variate VAR with Terrorism and RGDP according to AIC
42
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): 1973-2008 
 Included observations: 36  
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RGDP TERRORINDEX 
   
   RGDP(-1)  0.640044  0.368662 
  (0.18647)  (1.14380) 
 [ 3.43246] [ 0.32231] 
   
RGDP(-2)  0.285456 -0.662509 
  (0.23268)  (1.42730) 
 [ 1.22679] [-0.46417] 
   
RGDP(-3) -0.083049  0.873512 
  (0.16968)  (1.04084) 
 [-0.48944] [ 0.83924] 
   
TERRORINDEX(-1) -0.089462  0.624053 
  (0.03021)  (0.18533) 
 [-2.96102] [ 3.36726] 
   
TERRORINDEX(-2)  0.026554 -0.191223 
  (0.03807)  (0.23355) 
 [ 0.69744] [-0.81878] 
   
TERRORINDEX(-3)  0.075168  0.298993 
  (0.03207)  (0.19672) 
 [ 2.34380] [ 1.51986] 
   
C  0.519956 -0.313985 
  (0.16195)  (0.99342) 
 [ 3.21054] [-0.31606] 
   
    R-squared  0.932532  0.782539 
 Adj. R-squared  0.916962  0.732355 
 F-statistic  59.89422  15.59358 
 Akaike AIC -0.797249  2.830456 
 Schwarz SC -0.479808  3.147897 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
42 According to BIC lag length of 1 is optimal, with insignificant terrorism coefficients. Again, terrorism does not 
Granger-Cause RGDP with F-statistic: 1.48. 
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Table E1: Johansens Cointegration Test: Real GDP series 
 
Sample : 1973- 2008   
Included observations: 36   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Series: RGDP TERRORINDEX LOGFDI RINTRATE LOGEXPP   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.714500  100.2195  76.97277  0.0003 
At most 1 *  0.491826  57.60003  54.07904  0.0235 
At most 2  0.406257  34.58437  35.19275  0.0581 
At most 3  0.302582  16.85990  20.26184  0.1378 
At most 4  0.126729  4.607321  9.164546  0.3292 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.714500  42.61951  34.80587  0.0048 
At most 1  0.491826  23.01566  28.58808  0.2188 
At most 2  0.406257  17.72447  22.29962  0.1929 
At most 3  0.302582  12.25258  15.89210  0.1718 
At most 4  0.126729  4.607321  9.164546  0.3292 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table E2: Johansens Cointegration Test: Worker Remittances series 
 
   
 
 
Sample: 1973-2008 
 
 
  
Included observations: 36  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Series: LOGWREMC TERRORINDEX LOGFDI RINTRATE 
INFLATION   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.658743  87.97938  76.97277  0.0057 
At most 1  0.556253  51.42535  54.07904  0.0845 
At most 2  0.287747  23.80030  35.19275  0.4757 
At most 3  0.256076  12.26336  20.26184  0.4255 
At most 4  0.062812  2.205624  9.164546  0.7365 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.658743  36.55403  34.80587  0.0306 
At most 1  0.556253  27.62505  28.58808  0.0660 
At most 2  0.287747  11.53694  22.29962  0.6997 
At most 3  0.256076  10.05774  15.89210  0.3291 
At most 4  0.062812  2.205624  9.164546  0.7365 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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Table F: VAR with first differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES RInv DFDI RExp WRem GovExp RCon RGDP 
        
LD.RGDP       0.65 
       (0.777) 
LD.terrorindex -0.05 0.04 -0.06** -0.18 -0.02** 0.00 -0.07** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.202) (0.068) (0.001) (0.031) 
LD.FDI 0.02 -0.05 0.09 0.09 0.50*  0.15 
 (0.013) (0.146) (0.112) (0.084) (0.273)  (0.110) 
LD.Rintrate 0.09 -0.07  0.00 0.17  0.05 
 (0.118) (0.129)  (0.754) (0.239)  (0.113) 
LD.RExp   -0.68    -0.74 
   (0.572)    (0.738) 
LD.RInv -0.04 -0.08 0.60   0.00  
 (0.549) (0.601) (0.511)   (0.003)  
LD.Inflation 0.00 -0.00  -0.05 0.00   
 (0.026) (0.029)  (0.098) (0.051)   
LD.WRem    0.41**    
    (0.194)    
LD.GovExp      -0.01   
     (0.442)   
LD.RCon      -0.31*  
      (0.173)  
Constant 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.00*** 0.05 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.036) (0.218) (0.089) (0.001) (0.037) 
        
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.12 0.30 
F test (p-values) 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure G: Yearly plot terrorist incidents in Pakistan for GTD and SAPT dataset, correlation coefficient: 
0.77. 
 
 
 
 
Figure H1: CUSUM of square graph for Investment and terrorism 
Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
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Figure H2: CUSUM of square graph for RGDP and terrorism Regression  
Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
Figure H3: CUSUM of square graph for Wrem and terrorism Regression  
Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
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Figure I. Real Gross Fixed Capital formation growth predicted and actual patterns [Source: SBP]. 
 
 
Figure J: Defense consumption as a percentage of Current Expenditure [Source: SBP]. 
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Figure K1: Impulse Response of RGDP on Terrorism with 2, 3 and 4 steps ahead
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. 
  
Figure K2: Impulse Response of Real Investment on Terrorism with 2 and 4 Steps ahead. 
                                                             
43
 The same conclusions for all macroeconomic variables hold when we consider larger steps of 10 years ahead.  
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Figure K3: Impulse Response of Worker Remmitances on Terrorism 5 and 6 Steps ahead. 
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